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ABSTRACT
If legal moralism posits a normative connection between culpable
wrongdoing and punishment, what should legal moralists say about cases 
in which responsible agents commit culpable wrongs that have not been
proscribed ex ante by the state in which they occur?  More succinctly,
what is the status of the principle of legality according to legal moralists?
I argue that the absence of law typically, but perhaps not always, provides 
a sufficient non-desert basis to withhold punishment from culpable
wrongdoers whose punishment is deserved.  I critically examine the probable 
implications of this way of accounting for the significance of legality. 
I. LEGAL MORALISM AND DESERT
Legal moralists are often challenged to explain whether persons should
ever be punished for engaging in various kinds of dubious behaviors that 
fall outside the core of the criminal law: acts that seem wrongful but do
*  © 2017 Douglas Husak.  Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University. 
Thanks to Antony Duff, Sandra Marshal, Gideon Yaffe, and Leo Zaibert for helpful comments 
on an earlier draft.  Thanks also to Richard Arneson for his commentary at the Legal
Moralism conference at the University of San Diego School of Law. 
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not violate the rights of others, are merely offensive, display a vicious
character, and the like.  How legal moralists should approach these 
controversies—and how they understand the scope and limits of the 
substantive criminal law generally—depend on several preliminary matters I
will examine here.  Clarifying these issues should help to decide how legal
moralists might resolve some of these questions. 
Any attempt to critically assess a school of thought characterized by an 
ism, such as legal moralism, encounters an immediate difficulty: we must 
begin by identifying what legal moralism is. Here, as elsewhere, this 
exercise is perilous.  Several conceptions of legal moralism are available, 
and it is not even clear how to decide on the criteria by which one of
the alternatives is better or worse at representing the tradition to which it
purports to refer.1  All too often, philosophers who proceed to attack a 
given ism portray it uncharitably in order to make their target more vulnerable.2 
Admittedly, a definition of legal moralism is largely stipulative, and legal 
philosophers remain free to characterize it in nearly any way they like. 
Still, no definition should be accepted unless it is able to explain why so 
many of the most thoughtful and sophisticated contemporary penal theorists
are attracted to legal moralism.
Without pretending that my subsequent account definitively captures its
essence or nature, I hope that both friends and foes of legal moralism
recognize the two definitions I now offer as expressing a central tenet about
which all or most of the many versions concur. The several characterizations
of legal moralism, as I propose to understand them here, share a thesis
about a connection between culpable wrongdoing and deserved punishment.3 
According to what I call the reason version of legal moralism, culpable 
wrongdoing provides a desert-based reason to punish a responsible agent. 
If the legal moralist is taken to hold that culpable wrongdoing provides a 
reason to deserve punishment, it is open to him to contend that something 
1. For a nice taxonomy of positions, see James Edwards, An Instrumental Legal 
Moralism, 3 OXFORD STUD. IN PHIL. OF L. __ (forthcoming 2018). 
2. Any number of examples come to mind, as when legal or political philosophers 
define positivism, liberalism, or paternalism. I believe that critics of retributivism are 
especially prone to this tendency. See Douglas Husak, Retributivism in Extremis, 32 L. &
PHIL. 3, 5–7 (2013) (illustrating an example of an opponent to retributivism framing the 
definition of retributivism “narrowly”).
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN KERSHNAR, DESERT, RETRIBUTION, AND TORTURE 41–42 
(2001).  Some legal moralists might protest that their view connects culpable wrongdoing 
to criminalization rather than to punishment.  I tend to differ on two grounds.  First, on my
account, the connection between the criminal law and state punishment is conceptual; criminal
laws are contrasted from other kinds of law inasmuch as they make offenders eligible for
state punishment.  Second, connecting culpable wrongdoing with criminalization rather than
with punishment may conceal a contrast I want to highlight: between desert-based and non-
desert-based reasons in favor of or against punishment. 
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other than culpable wrongdoing may also provide a reason to deserve
punishment.  Thus, punishment may be deserved, even when no culpable 
wrongdoing has occurred.  Many legal moralists will contest this feature of
my definition precisely because it has few implications for substantive
controversies about the scope and limits of the criminal law.  Thus, a second 
account may be needed.  According to what I call the constraint version 
of legal moralism, punishment is undeserved in the absence of a culpable
wrong committed by a responsible agent. Notice that it is compatible with 
the constraint version that no one deserves to be punished. Conformity
with a constraint against deserved punishment does not entail that punishment
ever is deserved.  Thus, I imagine that quite a few legal moralists probably
combine both the reason and the constraint version of legal moralism: culpable
wrongdoing provides a desert-based reason to punish a responsible agent, 
and punishment is undeserved in the absence of a culpable committed by 
a responsible agent.  Again, within some vague parameters, theorists are free 
to formulate and defend their own thesis and label it legal moralism. In what
follows, I proceed as though the union of these two versions better expresses
legal moralism than either one alone.  For most of my subsequent purposes, 
however, I will employ the reason version, although it is important to remain
aware that it needs to be supplemented by the constraint version to form 
a more complete account.
The union of these two definitions enables us to understand the myriad 
respects in which particular versions—or conceptions—of legal moralism
can and do differ.  I briefly mention only four of these possible differences— 
and return to some of them later.  First, legal moralists might differ about 
the nature of culpability.  Is negligence a mode of culpability, for example,
or do persons never become blameworthy on the ground that their conduct 
deviates from that of a reasonable person in their situation?4  Second, they 
may disagree about what punishment is. If punishments are necessarily
imposed by the state, for example, it is hard to see how anything that 
is done to culpable wrongdoers by non-state actors can be any part of the 
punishment these persons deserve.5  Third, they may not concur about the 
strength of the reason culpable wrongdoers deserve punishment.6  Is this
 4. See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN WITH STEPHEN J. MORSE,
CRIME AND CULPABILITY 69–85 (2009). 
5. See Douglas Husak, Does the State Have a Monopoly to Punish Crime?, in THE
NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 97 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins eds., 2016). 
6. See Douglas Husak, Why Punish the Deserving?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 393, 393, 399–400 (Douglas Husak ed., 2010). 
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reason very weak, nearly sufficient, or somewhere in-between?  Fourth, 
and perhaps most importantly for present purposes, they might adopt 
competing theories about which conduct is morally wrong.  Even within
non-consequentialist traditions, philosophers notoriously disagree about 
the number, formulation, and application of various deontological constraints.7 
Undoubtedly legal moralists can and do disagree about quite a few additional 
matters as well.8 But without adopting a position on the foregoing four 
issues—especially the latter—no legal moralist should be confident about
the topic of this symposium: how to resolve particular debates involving
the scope and limits of the criminal law.
My formulation of both the reason and the constraint version is couched
in terms of desert. Admittedly, conceptions of legal moralism need not
use this controversial concept.  The very existence of desert, especially when 
it is negative, is hotly disputed among moral and political philosophers.9  Why,
then, do I employ it here?  Why not just say that legal moralists hold that
culpable wrongdoing provides a reason to punish a responsible agent, 
and punishment should not be imposed in the absence of a culpable wrong
committed by a responsible agent? My explanation begins by noting that
reasons are of different kinds. According to my understanding of legal 
moralism, the kind of reason in favor of punishment that is generated by
culpable wrongdoing is desert-based. Culpable wrongdoing does not, for
example, create a consequentialist or policy reason to punish.  As we will 
see, a central part of my project attempts to decide which reasons for and 
against inflictions of punishment involve desert and which do not.  Thus,
I try to decide which kinds of reasons to inflict or withhold punishment are
available or unavailable to the legal moralist.  A formulation of legal moralism 
that generically refers to justified punishments conceals a problem I believe
needs to be brought into the light—the problem with which I wrestle here. 
Although it is not an explicit part of my definition, I assume that many 
or even most legal moralists would ground their view in a principle of
retributive justice. A reason to deserve punishment is provided by culpable
wrongdoing because punishment conforms to or implements a principle
 7. Rudolf Schuessler, Violating Strict Deontological Constraints: Excuse or Pardon?, 
9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 587, 587–88 (2015).  See the various interpretations and applications 
of the Kantian “means principle” in Symposium on the Means Principle, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL.
741 (2016).
8. For example, how much of a theory of punishment can be derived from desert?
See Douglas Husak, What Do Criminals Deserve?, in LEGAL MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL
TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 49, 49–62 (Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & 
Stephen J. Morse eds., 2016). 
9. See  DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS 263–72 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 2011) 
(illustrating Kant’s rejection of “compatibilism about desert”); see also J.L.A. Garcia, Two 
Concepts of Desert, in 5 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 219, 219, 228 (Alan Mabe ed., 1986). 
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of retributive justice.10  Legal moralists who derive their view from a 
principle of retributive justice typically proceed to relate it to a theory of 
value.11 That is, legal moralists usually presuppose that conformity with
a principle of retributive justice is good.12 If conformity with this principle is
indeed a good, I assume the goodness in question is impersonal rather than
personal. That is, a world that conforms more closely to a principle of
retributive justice contains more value than a world that deviates from it, 
although the good that results from this conformity need not be good for 
anyone.
I have stressed what all or most accounts share in common to highlight 
a very important feature I have so far neglected: the legal dimension of
legal moralism.  Notice that neither the reason nor the constraint version 
of legal moralism mentions the state. Nor does either version mention the
law. As a result of these features of my definition, the problem on which
I propose to focus is illustrated by the following scenario.  Consider Peter,
a responsible agent who commits a culpable wrong.13  To be more concrete,
suppose Peter forcibly sexually penetrates his wife Samantha, despite 
what he knows to be her unequivocal lack of consent.  I assume without 
argument that Peter commits an act of rape, a clear instance of a culpable 
wrong.  I also assume without argument that Peter commits a kind of wrong 
the state has a basis to criminalize.  Then, as I have indicated, legal moralists
should infer the existence of a desert-based reason to punish Peter.  Suppose 
further, however, that the jurisdiction in which Peter resides recognizes a 
spousal rape exemption, so no statute or law proscribes his conduct ex 
ante.  Many legal moralists would be quick to say that such a jurisdiction 
would be warranted to repeal its spousal rape exemption so that Peter’s 
conduct could be punished in the future.14  But my question is not about
whether we have a sound basis for drafting better legislation ex post. 
Instead, I ask what the legal moralist should say about whether a desert-
based reason exists to punish Peter before the state has repealed its spousal
 10. See KERSHNAR, supra note 3, at 97–98. 
11. See id. at 69, 72. 
12. See id. at 71. 
13. For purposes of brevity, I delete the important requirements that the culpable
wrongdoer must be a responsible agent who acts without justification or excuse.  See Larry
Alexander, Culpability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW
218, 225 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011) (explaining justification and excuse in 
relation to culpability).
14. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 959, 976 (2000). 
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rape exemption, that is, at the moment the state has not yet criminalized 
his wrongful act.15 
I assume that many, and perhaps most, legal moralists would be inclined 
to answer that Peter’s punishment would be undeserved because no law
proscribes what he has done.  Why would they hold this view?  Since few 
defenders of legal moralism have explicitly commented on the kind of 
case I have described, it is hard to be sure.  According to the definition of 
legal moralism I have offered, isn’t Peter’s conduct a reason he deserves 
to be punished? If so, why would they think Peter does not deserve to be 
punished, unless they are prepared to abandon their commitment to legal
moralism? If they relate their view to the value of implementing a principle
of retributive justice, why should they believe the world contains less value
if Peter is punished—because his punishment is undeserved—than if he 
is not?  What is it about their allegiance to legal moralism that allows them 
to answer that Peter’s punishment would be undeserved? 
One simple way to respond to the problem I have raised would be to
amend my definition.  I am sure some theorists will reject my characterization 
of legal moralism precisely because it makes no reference to the state or 
its law.  Surely legal moralism, they will insist, just is a view about the 
state and its law.16  Thus, these theorists would revise my definition to hold 
that culpable wrongdoing provides a reason to deserve punishment when 
it violates the law of the state that has jurisdiction. When legal moralism 
is amended to apply specifically to the state and its law, its adherents could 
say that culpable wrongdoing itself provides no desert-based reason to 
punish Peter.  But what is the rationale for including the italicized clause 
in the definition?  Why is this amendment not an ad hoc device designed 
simply to circumvent the problem on which I focus?  Why should anyone 
think that culpable wrongdoing provides a reason to deserve punishment
only when it amounts to the breach of a law enacted ex ante?
Most theorists, legal moralist or otherwise, would answer that they 
support the inclusion of the italicized clause in my definition because they
accept the principle of legality.  Of course, they should accept it. To my
knowledge, no prominent theorist openly repudiates the principle of legality, 
which is sufficiently venerated to be enshrined in ever-useful Latin: nulla 
poena sine lege. For present purposes, I construe the principle of legality 
15. I am not the first theorist to notice that legal moralists struggle to account for
the role of the state and its law in exacting retribution.  See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts
About Retributivism, 91 ETHICS 537, 542 (1991).  Unlike Dolinko, however, I do not believe
this problem provides a sound basis for rejecting retributivism. 
16. See David O. Brink, Retributivism and Legal Moralism, 25 RATIO JURIS 496, 
496 (2012) (stating that “[l]egal moralism is the thesis that the state can and should criminalize 
immorality, as such, independently of whether the immorality involves harm”).
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to preclude state punishment unless the conduct for which it is imposed
has been proscribed by the law of the state with jurisdictional authority 
over the culpable wrongdoer. 
Nonetheless, in what follows I will argue that the answer I have attributed 
to most theorists is incorrect.  In the circumstance I have described, legal 
moralists should not attempt to amend, qualify, or otherwise fudge the definition
I have proposed. In other words, they should accept the implications of 
my original definition and agree that Peter’s culpable wrongdoing provides a
reason he deserves to be punished. I will try to defend this answer, mainly 
by explaining why it is not as implausible as appearances might suggest. 
My explanation accepts the principle of legality by conceding that the state 
would not be justified in punishing Peter.  More importantly for present
purposes, it does so by retaining my original formulation of legal moralism:
culpable wrongdoing provides a reason to deserve punishment. Instead
of accepting the invitation to construe legal moralism as a view about the
state and its law, I understand it as a view about what might be called the 
moral foundation of the state and its law—a view that can be used to 
assess and to evaluate the state and its law.  In other words, it is not a view
that depends on what the law of the state happens to be, but is better
construed as a view about what the law of the state ought to be. After all,
a conception of legal moralism as foundational helps to explain why
its adherents would appeal to it as the crucial premise of an argument to 
demand the abolition of the spousal rape exemption.  No such appeal is 
cogent if legal moralism only applies to situations in which the law of the 
state already proscribes instances of culpable wrongdoing. I think most
of its adherents do interpret legal moralism in this way.  At least, I propose 
to construe legal moralism as foundational in what follows. 
The key to my position is that legality is not a principle of desert.17 If
the state should not punish Peter when he culpably commits a moral wrong— 
as I agree to be the case—the basis for opposing his punishment is extraneous 
to his desert.  Non-desert considerations, in other words, preclude the state
from punishing him, even though considerations of desert provide a reason 
in favor of his punishment.18  According to the version of legal moralism I
 17. See Dolinko, supra note 15, at 542. 
18. See Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle of “Limiting 
Retributivism”: Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 3, 14 (2004) (discussing non-desert principles as general deterrence and incapacitation);
see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIM. & JUST. 
363, 393 (1997) (discussing non-desert goals as the incapacitation of high-risk offenders). 
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accept, Peter’s culpable wrongdoing itself provides a reason he deserves 
to be punished, but this reason is not sufficient for state punishment when 
no law or statute prohibits his conduct ex ante. The reason Peter deserves 
to be punished is not outweighed by a more stringent reason provided by
legality that specifies he does not deserve to be punished after all.  Instead, 
although the more stringent reason provided by legality indeed outweighs 
the reason for the state to punish Peter, the former reason has nothing to
do with his desert.  In other words, legality provides a non-desert basis to
show the state is unjustified, all things considered, in imposing the punishment 
it has a desert-based reason to suppose that Peter deserves.19 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF AND WORRIES ABOUT MY POSITION
My position about Peter’s case is designed to salvage legal moralism in
the face of what otherwise appears to be an inconsistency or an ad hoc
effort to reconcile it with the demands of the principle of legality.20 But 
my vindication is problematic and comes at a price—albeit a price I believe 
we should probably be willing to pay.  Identifying the likely implications 
of the position I take about legality should help us to decide whether legal 
moralism, as conceptualized above, is defensible.  Moreover, an assessment
of these implications will help to clarify how legal moralists should understand 
the nature and significance of desert—a concept I have said to be central
to their view. 
One such implication may or may not be surprising.  If Peter’s culpable
wrongdoing provides a desert-based reason to punish him, and no competing 
consideration shows he does not deserve to be punished, and yet the state
lacks an all-things-considered justification to punish him, it follows that
desert is not all that is needed to justify state punishment.  We should not 
construe legal moralism—or retributivism—to state that desert suffices to
justify state punishment.  The demands of legality, which I have categorized
as a non-desert consideration, must be satisfied before the state would be 
justified, all things considered, in inflicting even those punishments that 
are deserved.  Legal moralists who insist that desert provides an all-things-
19. For one definition of “all-things-considered” justifications, see Mitchell N. Bernan,
Modest Retributivism, in LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY
OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 35, 42 (Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., 2016), 
defining all-things-considered justifications as an “act or practice [that] is morally permitted in
light of all considerations.” 
20. Although my subsequent efforts focus on the school of thought of legal moralism in
particular, I do not believe that difficulties connecting deserved punishment with an all-
things-considered justification of punishment arise only within this tradition.  The problem 
is more general.  We might be puzzled to explain what role legality plays in any theory about 
the circumstances under which a reason has been given to suppose that punishment should
be imposed. 
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considered justification of punishment must be pressed to provide an
alternative account of why Peter should not be punished by the state when
his culpable wrongdoing has not been proscribed ex ante.
How do I defend my conceptualization of legality as necessary for state
punishment but extraneous to desert?  More generally, how should we 
distinguish those normative considerations that we agree to bear on the
all-things-considered justification of state punishment that are or are not 
matters of desert?  Although I lack a comprehensive theory of desert, I
presuppose at a minimum that desert is a reason-giving property of 
responsible agents. That is, the proposition “A deserves X by performing
Ω” gives some actual or possible person, S, a reason to give X to A. Whatever 
else Ω might include, I assume culpable wrongdoing is an excellent
candidate; it affects desert and thereby alters how some actual or possible 
person, S, has a reason to treat A. But it is hard to see how the absence of
a law proscribing A’s culpable wrongdoing can affect his desert. That is, 
Ω does not include “culpable wrongdoing only when proscribed by law.” 
Why not?  Here is one suggestion: The absence of a law prohibiting A’s
conduct is totally outside of his control, and variables totally outside of 
one’s control are hard to rationalize in terms of desert.  Of course, moral 
and legal philosophers notoriously disagree about what is and is not under
an agent’s control.21  But if the state lacks an all-things-considered justification 
to punish Peter, as I concede to be the case, the basis for reaching this
conclusion does not seem to depend on anything that can plausibly be thought 
to be under his control and thus material to his desert.  The legal moralist
as I have portrayed her is correct to contend that desert provides a desert-
based reason to punish Peter, even though the state would not be justified
in punishing him, all things considered. 
Perhaps resistance to this conclusion can be softened by noticing that
quite a few other variables that are material to whether the state would be
justified in punishing Peter are not germane to his desert.  Perhaps territorial
jurisdiction is the most obvious such variable.22  If Peter is a Canadian tourist
who rapes his wife in Kenya, where the spousal rape exemption continues 
21. See Paul Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning 
and Rational Self-Governance, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 349, 352 (2008) (discussing the disagreement
about what constitutes control). 
22. For worries about how legal moralists resolve matters of jurisdiction, see R.A.
Duff, Legal Moralism and Public Wrongs, in LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS:
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 95, 99–100 (Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Stephen
J. Morse eds., 2016). 
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to exist, the state of Mexico would lack an all-things-considered justification
for punishing him. But Mexico’s lack of an all-things-considered justification
for punishing Peter has nothing to do with his lack of desert.  A desert-based
reason does exist to punish Peter, although this reason is not available to 
the state of Mexico.  As I construe legality, it operates similarly to jurisdiction.
I do not think my conceptualization of legal moralism requires us to
deny that the reasons generated by desert are inherently relational. If “A
deserves X by performing Ω,” some actual or possible person, S, has a
reason to give X to A. On one view, Peter’s culpable wrongdoing provides 
a reason he deserves to be punished, even if he perpetrates spousal rape 
on the planet Mars.  This view might be said to involve a commitment to 
cosmic desert.  On a second view, however, Peter’s culpable wrongdoing 
provides a reason he deserves to be punished only by some person or
institution to which he is suitably related.23  Each of these two views
of desert has its strengths and weaknesses; I tentatively prefer the relational 
view but admit to uncertainty about it.
Regardless of how or whether we conceptualize the desert-claims of
legal moralism as relational, the implications of my position may even be 
more noteworthy than I have indicated thus far.  If I am correct that the 
absence of a law proscribing Peter’s conduct does not alter his desert, it 
is equally true that the presence of a law proscribing his conduct is
immaterial to his desert.  Assume now that the spousal rape exemption
has been abolished in the jurisdiction with authority over Peter.  Suppose
Peter* breaches a newly enacted statute prohibiting spousal rape when he 
again forcibly penetrates Samantha without her consent.  The existence of
this law obviously alters the all-things-considered justification of state 
punishment.  But does the existence of this new law alter Peter’s* desert? 
In other words, is the case for supposing Peter* deserves to be punished 
strengthened relative to the original case in which Peter’s conduct was not 
prohibited by law?  No basis for reaching an affirmative answer can be
derived from legal moralism as I have defined it—or, indeed, from any
other source of which I am aware.  Just as the absence of a law proscribing 
Peter’s conduct does not decrease his desert, the presence of a law
proscribing Peter’s* conduct does not increase his desert.  In either scenario, 
the law itself is immaterial to what Peter and Peter* deserve.
If I am correct thus far, a more general question emerges: If legal moralism 
should be construed to hold that culpable wrongdoing per se provides a 
reason punishment is deserved, what role is left for law to play? 
Expressed differently and more bluntly, why should legal moralists who 
ground the rationale for punishment in considerations of desert and principles
23.  Of course, the nature of this “suitable relationship” requires explication. 
390
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of retributive justice care about the content of the law at all?  When the 
question is posed in this way, the position I have attributed to legal moralists
sounds even more counterintuitive than anything said to this point.  I need to
identify the probable source of these intuitive reservations and explain
why we should not be overly troubled by them. 
To offset these worries, I need to explain why the content of the law 
matters. I do not deny that the existence of the law can and often does 
make a normative difference to our moral judgments about how people 
may be treated.  I simply deny that the difference the law can make is a 
difference in their desert.  Law may be needed for several non-desert reasons. 
For example, law might be needed to provide notice to prospective 
wrongdoers, which in turn is required to give them a fair opportunity to
avoid the hardships inherent in punishment.  To illustrate how the notice 
that law provides can make a difference to our normative judgments about 
how persons may be treated without making a difference to their desert,
consider an example involving two terrorists, Mutt and Jeff.  Mutt bursts 
into a classroom, killing each of six students immediately.  Jeff also bursts 
into a classroom, threatening to kill each of six students unless they leave
within plenty of time to vacate the room.  When no one leaves, Jeff, like 
Mutt, massacres all six.  Normative objections can be raised against Mutt’s 
conduct to which Jeff is immune; unlike Jeff, he acted worse inasmuch as 
he gave his victims no reasonable opportunity to avoid being killed.  But 
we should not be tempted to explain the normative difference between
Mutt and Jeff in terms of desert—either their desert or that of their victims.
Both Mutt and Jeff culpably commit a grievous moral wrong and treat their 
victims contrary to their desert.  This example helps to show that agents
who are notified that they will be harmed if they perform a given act do 
not thereby become more deserving of harm when they perform that act.
Conversely, agents who are not notified that they will be harmed if they 
perform a given act do not thereby become less deserving of harm when 
they perform that act.  The importance of law, fair notice, and the value of a
reasonable opportunity to avoid harm, however valuable, can be explained 
without reference to desert.  The state indeed treats Peter worse than Peter*,
but not because Peter is less deserving of punishment than Peter*. 
This position can be tested further by imagining yet a third variant of
my example of Peter and Samantha.  Suppose Peter** believes spousal rape
is proscribed by law, even though he is mistaken and no law prohibits it. 
If Peter** were prosecuted for raping Samantha, he would be relieved to 
learn that the law would demand his acquittal. But we should not say that 
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he should be acquitted because he lacked a fair opportunity to avoid
punishment.  Law makes a difference to whether the state has an all-things- 
considered justification to punish Peter**, but the difference it makes has 
nothing to do with the unfairness to which Mutt subjects the students in 
my foregoing example.  Legality plays a crucial but heretofore unspecified
role in whether the state has an all-things-considered justification to
punish any of the three Peters I have described, but that role cannot be
explained in terms of desert. 
When I said that a desert-based reason has been given to punish Peter
and Peter** for committing a culpable wrong that is not proscribed, but
that an identical desert-based reason has been given to punish Peter* for 
committing the same culpable wrong that is proscribed, I am of course
referring to moral desert. Unless the concept is unintelligible, as I sometimes
suspect,24  I am prepared to admit that Peter*, but not Peter or Peter**, is
legally deserving of state punishment.  Legal theorists would be sure to
protest vehemently if the state were to punish either Peter or Peter** in
violation of the principle of legality.  They should be pressed to identify 
the exact basis of their outrage.  Does their complaint involve desert? If 
so, does their complaint solely involve legal desert—that Peter and Peter** 
are treated contrary to their desert according to law? Whatever the answer, it
is moral rather than legal desert with which I am concerned. 
When Peter rapes Samantha, I have indicated that legal moralists believe 
there to be a desert-based reason to punish him.  On my interpretation of 
desert as a reason-giving property, it follows that some actual or possible
person has a reason to inflict this punishment.  It may be controversial, 
however, exactly who has a reason to punish Peter.  If the state does not
have it, who does?25  At least one answer, however, is obvious to me:
Samantha has a reason to treat Peter as he deserves, that is, to punish him.
Perhaps friends and relatives of Samantha, and a great many others, have
this reason too. Thus, I am emphatic that legal moralism or legality should 
not be construed to stand in the way of treating Peter as he deserves.  Legal
moralism and legality only stand in the way of the state treating Peter as 
he deserves.
Earlier I said that legal moralists might differ among themselves about
what punishment is.26 Fully aware of this possible disagreement, let me
indicate without supporting argument what I take punishment to be in 
24. See Mark Greenberg, How Mistakes Excuse: Genuine Desert, 11 APA NEWSL.
PHIL. & L. 8, 10 (2011), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.apaonline.org/resource/collection/ 
305C30F7-608F-411F-9CFA-BE03BEBCE990/v11n1_Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCL3-BQVX].
25. Might we say that a possible state, which has proscribed spousal rape, has this 
reason? 
26. See supra Part I. 
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order to support my claim that Samantha has a reason to inflict it. 
Punishment, as I understand it, is a stigmatizing deprivation intentionally
imposed for what someone has done. Pursuant to this definition, I think
it is apparent not only that Samantha has a reason to punish Peter, but also 
that most of us would hold her to be justified to do so.  Of course, Samantha’s
punishment cannot be disproportionate to the seriousness of his offense. 
Nor may she impose some of the kinds of deprivation that are reserved for 
the state, for example, by confining Peter to a makeshift prison she has 
constructed in her basement.27  At the very least, however, Samantha would 
be entitled to have a variety of reactive attitudes toward Peter as a result 
of what he has done. But Samantha would not only be entitled to change 
her attitudes about Peter; it would be appropriate for her to change her 
behavior as well.  Surely, she would be justified to shun Peter, bar him 
from her house, and tell her friends what he has done so they will dissociate 
from him as well.28 These deprivations would be intended not only to protect
Samantha from future harm, but to stigmatize Peter for what he has done
in the past.  If I am correct, these sanctions amount to punishments. According 
to the view I have attributed to the legal moralist, Peter’s culpable wrongdoing 
provides a desert-based reason to punish Peter, and the most obvious 
candidate to impose this punishment is Samantha herself.29 
Because the state accepts the principle of legality, it may punish Peter*, 
but not Peter or Peter**.  Why should legality make this difference?30 If 
27. Exactly why some severe modes of punishment are available to the state and 
not to private actors raises a number of questions for which I have no clear answer. 
28. I borrow the term “dissociate” from Leora Dahan Katz.  See Leora Dahan Katz, 
Response Retributivism (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that to
meaningfully dissociate from the devaluation inherent in the action of the wrongdoer, there 
is a duty to respond negatively and impose burdens upon wrongdoers in response to their 
wrongdoing).
29. For arguments that state punishments are continuous with those imposed by
private actors, see LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 61 (2006). 
30. Michael Moore is among the handful of exceptions who discuss the significance 
of legality to legal moralists.  He does so in the context of defending the actus reus
requirement, writing that this requirement and the rule of law serve a “heuristic function”
by increasing the probability that “judges can best punish moral wrongs by punishing legally
prohibited acts.”  MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 243 (1993).  He later writes that “the principle
of legality” is among those “collective goods” that “override the achievement of retributive 
justice.”  MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: ATHEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 186–87 (1997).
These remarks are on the right track.  If my subsequent comments are cogent, however, 
Moore’s view is not exactly correct.  First, I am unsure why legality should have much to
do with actus reus. More importantly, the principle of legality does not override the achievement
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Samantha may punish Peter, why can’t the state do so as well?  This question 
is surprisingly difficult; I do not exaggerate in saying that an extended
defense of the principle of legality in criminal theory has yet to be offered.31 
Suppose Peter is arrested and prosecuted.  He should be able to successfully
plead legality as a defense.  I believe we can gain some insight into the
significance of legality by determining what kind of defense he would 
plead.  Paul Robinson usefully identifies a number of what he calls non-
exculpatory public policy defenses—grounds on which punitive sanctions 
should not be inflicted, even though the defendant may deserve them.32  I 
propose that Peter’s defense should be conceptualized similarly: as an 
instance of a public policy defense that precludes the state from having an 
all-things-considered justification for punishing him, notwithstanding his 
desert.33  But this proposal is a conclusion in search of an argument.  The
details of the public policy bases for recognizing such defenses as double 
jeopardy and diplomatic immunity are very different.34  In what follows,
I will try to briefly describe the nature of the public policy, non-desert
consideration that militates against state punishment of Peter.  Although 
I will express some misgivings about my rationale, I challenge those criminal 
theorists who find my efforts to be unpersuasive to offer a better account 
of the kind of defense Peter would plead. 
I hazard the following response to the problem of why legality precludes
state punishment even though it does not affect desert.  In an ideal realm,
where everyone agrees upon the content of morality, the principle of legality
would not preclude the state from imposing punishment.  The state would
have a reason to punish persons such as Peter who commit culpable wrongs;
a legislature would have no need to proscribe these wrongs in advance. 
Samantha, after all, has not proscribed Peter’s wrong in advance in order 
to have a reason to punish him; why, then, should the state have to do what 
she need not do?  The answer must be drawn from political philosophy, from
considerations that govern and limit the power of states.  Not all impositions
of retributive justice; it does not preclude the justifiability of all punishments, such as those 
imposed by victims of wrongdoing.  It only disables the state from pursuing retribution. 
31. For one such attempt, see Peter Westen, Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 
26 L. & PHIL. 229, 229 (2007). 
32. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUMB.
L. REV. 199, 229–32 (1982). 
33. Robinson himself seemingly construes the defense Peter would plead as a “failure
of proof” defense, which he generally claims to apply when “all elements of the offense 
charged cannot be proven.” Id. at 204. But this way to conceptualize the defense in Peter’s
case is peculiar; the lack of state standing to punish is not due to failures of proof. 
34. See, e.g., Peter Campbell Brown, The Defense of Diplomatic Immunity, 334 INS.
L.J. 812 (1950). But see, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1001 (2000) (reviewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY,
THE LAW (1998)). 
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of punishment are so constrained.  Perhaps divine justice is immune from 
this restriction; I doubt that theologians insist that god must abstain from
exacting retribution against sinners unless he has specifically proscribed 
their sins ex ante.35  In any event, criminal justice in the real world is so 
constrained. On the planet we inhabit, we have ample reason to employ
a surrogate for morality, which does the real normative work.  This surrogate, 
of course, is statutory law. A separate treatise would be needed to recount 
the many advantages of resorting to statutory law in criminal justice rather
than making a direct appeal to morality,36 so the explanation I will provide
is cursory.
The main, but not the only, reason to employ legislation is that laypersons
and legal officials alike remain uncertain and divided about the content of 
our moral duties, and an authoritative device is needed to allow the
political process to function while these disputes are ongoing.37  Good
citizens as well as bad have caused havoc because of their misplaced
confidence about what morality permits and prohibits.38  The state uses 
statutory law rather than morality to identify persons eligible for liability
and punishment because direct recourse to the factor that is normatively
relevant to their desert—morality itself—would be too divisive and uncertain. 
Even if there is a “right answer” to all moral disputes, we cannot expect
people to concur about what that answer is.  Even when we generally agree
about what is morally permissible or impermissible, the most experienced
philosophers continue to debate about the details—where law is most 
needed.39  Since we lack a mechanism to settle on a canonical formulation 
of moral wrongs, law is our next best option.  As every legal theorist can
attest, of course, statutory law itself is far less certain than we might prefer.40 
35. Can clever sinners really escape their just deserts by finding loopholes in god’s
commands?  For a discussion of Jewish loopholers who try to avoid prohibitions of work 
on the Sabbath, see LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE PART II 71–136 (2011). 
36. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015) (arguing that the 
coercive force of the law, rather than an internalization of its principles as morals, drives 
people to obey the law). 
37. One might call this the settlement function of law. See LARRY ALEXANDER &
EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW
181–223 (2001).
38. See, e.g., State v. Singleton, 48 A.3d 285, 293 (N.J. 2012) (explaining that the 
defendant believed it morally right to kill his girlfriend because God told him to do so). 
39. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 37. 
40. But perhaps some vagueness is good.  See Timothy Endicott, The Value of
Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 14 (Andrei Marmor &
Scott Soames eds., 2011). 
 395










   
 
 
   
  
 
   




      
  
 
    
    
   
     
    
        
But one can only imagine the chaos that would ensue if a system of criminal 
justice empowered officials to enforce the rules of morality without the 
need to express them ex ante in statutes.41 
In the absence of a pre-existing statute, legal officials should probably
lack confidence—beyond a reasonable doubt—that the type of case 
represented by Peter is before them.  I have stipulated that Peter commits
a culpable wrong, but I fear that others will disagree.  After all, many 
states apparently did disagree until fairly recently in legal history.42 How 
confident must we be that we are presented with an instance of culpable 
wrongdoing when the legislature of the democratic state in which we 
reside has failed to criminalize it?  Just as we should withhold the power 
to conduct illegal searches or to punish persons long after their wrongdoing 
has occurred, we should withhold the power to enforce the rules of morality 
without first codifying them in statutes.  Historical examples from Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union in which states claimed the authority to
punish wrongdoers who did not clearly violate the law—which involve 
the infamous principle of analogy—serve as chilling reminders that such
powers are best withheld.43  In short, a world in which states directly punish
immorality rather than wrongs specifically codified in statutory law would 
grant too much power to legal officials.44 Allowing persons such as Peter 
to evade state punishment seems like a small price to pay to keep political 
power within acceptable boundaries. 
Although I accept the foregoing account of why legality is required to 
justify state punishment, I admit to misgivings about it.  I have simply
alleged that the non-desert consideration provided by legality outweighs 
the desert consideration provided by culpable wrongdoing in constructing 
an all-things-considered justification of state punishment.  But why should 
the balance always tip in this way?  Is there an independent reason to weight
these two factors as I have done?  My answer has been that a direct appeal
to morality itself—the normatively relevant factor—is too uncertain and
divisive. But how plausible is this answer in cases in which morality is
crystal clear?  Spousal rape may not be a good example.  We must resist the
tendency to apply our contemporary judgments to conduct that may have 
been morally uncertain at the time it was performed.  Even slavery, an 
41. Many philosophers have written extensively about how democratic systems of 
law should respond to the inevitability of disagreement. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 54–58 (1993), for a discussion of the burdens of judgment. 
42. See Judith A. Lincoln, Abolishing the Marital Rape Exemption: The First Step
in Protecting Married Women from Spousal Rape, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1219, 1227–30 (1989). 
43. See Note, The Use of Analogy in Criminal Law, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 615– 
19 (1947).
44. See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1998), for a rigorous
review of Blackstone’s famous maxim. 
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institution no sensible person defends today, was regarded as morally
acceptable throughout most of human history.  But what about acts of
genocide and mass murder perpetrated in the twentieth century?  Surely, 
a consensus has emerged that these practices are monstrous, even if a state
has failed to proscribe them.  Perhaps the atrocities for which Nazis were
tried at Nuremberg provide the best example of a context in which legality 
does not outweigh the desert-based reason to punish.45 The moral desert of 
the Nazis was enormous, and the case against punishment provided by 
legality was weak.  These examples, however, are almost certain to be unusual.
Almost without exception, the non-desert factor of legality outweighs the 
desert factor of culpable wrongdoing in the domain of state punishment. 
Thus legality creates a decisive barrier against the infliction of state
punishment on persons such as Peter and Peter**, who culpably commit 
a moral wrong that is not proscribed by law.  But the barrier to state
punishment is not that it would treat Peter or Peter** in a way he does not
deserve: Peter would not be treated contrary to his desert if the state punished
him.  Hence, I conclude that if the state should abstain from punishment, 
as I have conceded to be the case, the rationale must involve considerations
other than desert.  To my mind, the best rationale refers to practical realities— 
to the lack of confidence that such persons can be correctly identified. 
Any procedure to detect culpable wrongdoers without reference to law would 
be bound to generate social turmoil. Again, the legal practice of acquitting 
individuals who deserve the stigmatizing deprivations inherent in state
punishment but whose conduct is not proscribed ex ante by law is the price 
we must pay for a political system that brings about tremendous benefits 
relative to no system at all or to a system that dispenses with legality
altogether. 
At the end of the day, how should we feel about Peter?  He deserves 
punishment, but, unlike Peter*, it is at least controversial whether anyone
other than Samantha, and those who act on her behalf, is justified to
administer it.  I assume Samantha is permitted not to punish; what if she 
elects not to do so? If I am correct to ground legal moralism in a principle 
of retributive justice, it follows that the value of retributive justice is not 
served if no one treats Peter as he deserves.46  Citizens should not be elated
 45. See generally F. Regan Nerone, The Legality of Nuremberg, 4 DUQ. U. L. REV. 146 
(1966) (discussing the magnitude of Nazis’ crimes, their desert, and the legality of punishment).
46. My position gives rise to familiar puzzles about the value of mercy—puzzles I
will not explore here.  See Heidi M. Hurd, The Morality of Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
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when policy grounds are invoked to preclude the state from treating persons
as they deserve.  Public policy defenses frequently are applied to acquit
those who morally deserve to be punished.  The unease we feel about this
result, of course, is what gives us a motivation to amend the law so that 
state punishment would be justified, all things considered, in the future. 
In the case of Peter, this motivation should lead to an abolition of the spousal
rape exemption.47 
Thus, the state lacks a justification for punishing Peter, but Samantha
has a justification to punish him.  I suggested that others might have this 
reason as well.  But who?  Suppose we return to the suggestion that the 
desert considerations created by culpable wrongdoing are relational in the 
following sense: those who are wronged by a given act of wrongdoing are 
the clearest candidates to have standing to inflict the punishment the wrongdoer
deserves. Although I am tempted to think that culpable wrongdoing is 
relational in this way, I have no conclusive argument about why this is so. 
Suppose, however, that only those who are wronged by an act have standing
to punish it. We might describe such persons as victims.  The following
substantive thesis is implied if this view is correct: unless there is a sense
in which the state is wronged or victimized by given instances of culpable 
wrongs, we have no clear basis for why it has standing to punish those who 
perpetrate them.  Restricting the culpable wrongs the state may punish to 
public wrongs is a way to ensure the state has the standing to punish them.48 
I conclude by briefly considering the application of this thesis to cases
that have long divided philosophers of criminal law and gives rise to 
disputes about whether legal moralism provides a sensible framework for 
criminalization—for a view about the scope and limits of the criminal 
sanction that animates our symposium. Criminal paternalism, for example, 
would allow persons to be punished when their acts cause significant harms 
to the very persons who commit them.49  One of many possible ways to block 
states from punishing persons for paternalistic reasons is to contend
that morality is necessarily other-regarding.50  When persons behave
imprudently or foolishly—by taking huge and unnecessary risks with their 
own health or welfare, for example—any negative judgment we might
apply is not a moral judgment. However foolish it may be to weld metals
without protective goggles, for example, the agent is not deficient from a 
389 (2007), for a discussion of such puzzles surrounding the proper place of mercy in a 
retributive justice system.
47. See Lincoln, supra note 42, at 1219–20. 
48. See Duff, supra note 22, at 100–03. 
49. See generally PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Christian Coons & Michael 
Weber eds., 2013). 
50. See also Douglas Husak, Penal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 39 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013). 
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moral point of view.  I am undecided about whether morality is necessarily 
other-regarding. In any event, an additional reason to suppose that the state
may not punish persons for paternalistic reasons, even if their conduct is 
wrongful, is that the state lacks standing to do so.  The state may lack standing 
to punish because only those who are wronged or victimized by a wrongful
act have a reason to punish it.  To the extent that the conduct in question 
is self-regarding, it is hard to see how it wrongs anyone who then would
gain standing to punish. Self-regarding wrongs, if they are wrongs at all,
are not public wrongs. Thus, legal moralism as I have construed it may
have important implications for the scope and limits of the substantive 
criminal law.
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